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Abstract 
  
This study extends the literature on fighting software piracy by investigating how Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) regimes interact with technology to mitigate software piracy when 
existing levels of piracy are considered. Two technology metrics (internet penetration rate and 
number of PC users) and six IPRs mechanisms (constitution, IPR law, main IP laws, WIPO 
Treaties, bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties) are used in the empirical analysis. The 
statistical evidence is based on: (i) a panel of 99 countries for the period 1994-2010   and (ii) 
interactive contemporary and non-contemporary Quantile regressions.The findings show that the 
relevance of IPR channels in the fight against software piracy is noticeably contingent on the 
existing levels of technology embodied in the pirated software. There is a twofold policy interest 
for involving modern estimation techniques such as interactive Quantile regressions. First, it 
uncovers that the impact of IPR systems on software piracy may differ depending on the nature 
of technologies used. Second, the success of initiatives to combat software piracy is contingent 
on existing levels of the piracy problem. Therefore, policies should be designed differently 
across nations with high-, intermediate- and low-levels of software piracy. 
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Introduction  
 Today, it is amply clear that knowledge economy (KE) is a key driver of competitive 
advantage and cross-country development in the twenty-first century. The former is substantially 
traceable to dynamics of intellectual capital as well as the regimes of Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) applicable in the country. Accordingly, IPRs protection channels play a central mission in 
the drive to promote knowledge-based economies around the world. Moreover, such IPRs are 
closely linked with the four dimensions of the World Bank’s KE index, namely: education, 
information and communications technologies (ICTs), economic incentives and institutional 
regime and innovation (Asongu, 2014a; Martínez-Sánchez & Romeu, 2018).  
 The contemporary relevance of KE extends a longstanding debate on the importance of 
IPRs in development processes. To be sure, there is some consensus in the literature that in order 
to facilitate development catch-up processes, reversed engineering in technology is essential, at 
least in the short term. This evaluation is based on the observation that in developing countries, 
the architecture of technology is fundamentally more imitative and adaptive (Maskus and 
Penubarti, 1995; Seyoum, 1996; Mansfield, 1994; Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Asongu, 2017a, 
2017b)1. To this end, there has recently been a worldwide proliferation of technologies that are 
used to copy, imitate or pirate KE products and services (Asongu et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2018). 
Indeed, a review of contemporary literature indicates that whereas there are substantial and 
justifiable worries about the spread of software piracy2, there is not yet a consensus on the 
strategies for protecting IPRs in the software industry.  
                         
1 With respect to this strand of the literature, more strict IPRs regimes are adopted as nations make the transition 
from ‘developing countries’ to ‘developed countries’. Such tight IPRs regimes are likely to, inter alia: (i) boosts 
innovation and technology transfer (Lee and Mansfield, 1996); (ii) favour exports (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995) and 
(iii) enhance investment by  multinational corporations (see Mansfield, 1994; Seyoum, 1996).  
2 Throughout this study, the terms ‘piracy’ and ‘software piracy’ are employed interchangeably.   
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 The debate surrounding IPRs protection has fundamentally centered on two dominant 
schools of thought. According to the first school, strict protection of IPRs facilitates economic 
development (see Gould and Gruben, 1996; Falvey et al., 2006) through its positive impact on 
productivity enabling factors. By contrast, the second school considers stringent IPRs as very 
damaging to the catch-up process by poor countries (Andrés and Goel, 2011, 2012; Yang and 
Maskus, 2001; Kim et al., 2017; Asongu and Tchamyou, 2020).  The relevance of this narrative 
is illustrated by the adoption and ratification of IPRs treaties at the international level. These 
authors argued that less stringent IPRs regimes are relevant in the short term in order to enable 
technology spillovers to less developed countries. Such views are supported by recent software 
piracy literature notably that software piracy increases: scientific publications (Asongu, 2014a), 
copyright holders’ gains (Tunca and Wu, 2012) as well as economic development which are pro-
poor (Asongu, 2014b).  
 The differing positions adopted by academic scholars on the consequences of IPRs 
protection accords motivated the emergence of qualitative studies (Lau, 2006; Peitz and 
Waelbroeck, 2006) as well as an evolving strand of quantitative work on the socioeconomic 
drivers of software piracy in the copyrighting industry (see Andrés, 2006a; Bezmen and Depken, 
2006; Banerjee et al., 2005; Bezmen and Depken, 2004; Goel and Nelson, 2009; Rishi and 
Mehra, 2017; Andrés and Asongu, 2013, 2016; Asongu and Meniago, 2016).  
Generally speaking, contemporary literature in the battle against software piracy could  
be discussed under three main categories. The first stream recognizes the importance of adopting 
non-legal mechanisms in the fight against software piracy. Examples of such non-legal channels 
may include online-only offerings, community engagements and the management of digital 
rights (Holm, 2014); social learning and self-control (Burruss et al., 2018; Omar and Ahmed, 
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2018) and a block chain approach (Bhawna et al., 2018). The second category emphasizes the 
effectiveness of employing catch-up policy initiatives in the harmonization of global IPRs as 
well as the implications of such synchronization worldwide (see Asongu et al., 2018). The third 
classification discusses the characteristics of the formal channels for combating the proliferation 
of software piracy. These comprised: (i) Software User Identity Module (Adu et al., 2014); (ii) 
good institutions and human development (Driouchi et al., 2015); (iii) fairness and equity 
perceptions (Glass and Wood, 1996; Douglas et al., 2007); (v) lawsuits against peer-to-peer 
networks and related customers (Tunca, 2012); (iv) information institutions such as religion (El-
Baily and Gouda, 2011); (v) standard of democracy (Piquero and  Piquero, 2006); (vi) certainty 
in punishment (Yoo et al., 2011); (vii) IPRs protection mechanisms that depend on legal origins 
(Asongu, 2015); (viii) codes of knowledge ethics in institutions of learning  (Santillanes and 
Felder, 2015)  and (ix) level of economic development and regulatory quality (Chang et al., 
2017).  
In the light of the above, the present study is closest to the third category. Noticeably, the 
corresponding literature leaves space for improvement in the understanding of how technology 
interacts with formal IPRs mechanisms to successfully tackle the global software piracy 
problem. We address this gap in the literature by responding to the following research question: 
how do IPRs regimes interact with technologies to mitigate software piracy when existing levels 
of software piracy are considered? 
 By engaging these problem statements, the present inquiry contributes to the existing 
literature in two key ways. First, for the most part, the aforementioned literature on combating 
global software piracy by means of legal and non-legal IPRs strategies has centered on non-
interactive regressions (Asongu et al., 2018). We argue that to better understand how IPR 
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mechanisms affect software piracy, it is essential to consider these IPR systems in conjunction 
with the technology embodied in the pirated software. Hence, we examine the influence of both 
IPRs and technology measurements in interactive regressions in order to understand how 
different IPR channels affect different technologies. The policy relevance of interactive 
modeling is that IPRs mechanisms may differently affect technologies with which software 
piracy is used. Second, the engaged studies have investigated the effectiveness of 
macroeconomic factors and IPR systems in tackling software piracy at the conditional mean 
values (see Andrés, 2006b; Asongu, 2015). This study extends the underlying literature by 
investigating the effects of IPRs throughout the conditional distributions of software piracy. In so 
doing, we are able to distinguish between countries with high-, intermediate- and low-initial 
levels of software piracy. The policy implications of controlling for initial levels in piracy in the 
empirical exercise is founded on the intuition that initiatives to combat software piracy may not 
be successful unless they are contingent on existing levels of software piracy. Therefore such 
policies should be designed differently across nations with high-, intermediate- and low-levels of 
software piracy.  
We are aware of the risk of carrying out empirical measurements without well established 
theories. However, we argue from intuition, that Property Rights Institutions (PRIs) are designed 
to discourage the copying and imitation of software technologies. Such is consistent with the 
argument by Costantini and Lupi (2005) and Narayan et al. (2011) that reporting facts even in 
the absence of a formal theoretical model is not an inadequate scientific activity. In principle, 
applied econometrics should not be restricted to the simple empirical exercise of either refuting 
or validating economic theories.  
 7 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section on “Data and 
methodology”, we discuss the characteristics of data and methodology employed in the study. 
The “Empirical results” section presents the empirical findings and corresponding explanations. 
The study explores some relevant policy implications of the findings in the “Further discussion 
and policy implications” section.  The “Conclusion and future research directions” section 
briefly summarises the main findings of the study before providing some potential directions for 
future research on software piracy.  
 
Data and methodology 
Data  
 The study comprises a panel of 99 countries with data for the period 1994-2010 from the: 
World Bank Development Indicators (WDI); Business Software Alliance (BSA) and World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)3. Limitations to the periodicity and number of 
countries are due to data availability constraints.  
 The dependent variable which is software piracy is defined as “the unauthorized copying 
of computer software which constitutes copyright infringement for either commercial or personal 
use” (SIIA, 2000)4. From a multidimensional perspective, software piracy can be organized, 
individuals’ piracy and commercial or business piracy. According to the narrative, three 
principal types of software piracy are apparent: end-user copying, downloading and 
counterfeiting. Due to these different dimensions, a major concern in the literature has been how 
to derive an adequate software piracy indicator. In this study, the level of software is computed 
as the difference between the demand for new software applications (calculated as Personal 
                         
3 The countries are presented in Panel B of Appendix 2. 
4 SIIA stands for Software and Information Industry Association.  
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Computer shipments) and software piracy that is supplied legally. Hence, software piracy is 
measured in the inquiry as the percentage of software (business software for the most part) that is 
illegally installed yearly (without a license) in a specific country. The software piracy variable is 
then defined in percentage terms ranging from a scale of  0 percent in scenarios where no yearly 
installed software is of pirated origin to 100 percent for situations where all yearly installed 
software is obtained from a pirated source.  More information on the measurement of software 
piracy is available from BSA (2007, 2009)5.  The data on software piracy from BSA industry is 
the most widely used in the literature, though subject to some upward bias6.  
 Two technology variables are used: the number of Personal Computers (PCs) and internet 
penetration. The adoption of the PCs builds on the fact that it is consistent with the definition of 
software piracy provided above. The internet as a technology mechanism is based on  insight and 
observation from recent KE literature (Tchamyou, 2017).   
 Six IPR metrics are considered, namely: constitution, IPR laws, main IP laws, WIPO 
treaties, bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties. Accordingly, there is a wealth of literature on 
the close connection between software piracy and IPRs laws (including legal frameworks and 
international treaties) (Driouchi et al., 2015; Baghci et al., 2006; Ki et al., 2006; Andrés, 2006a; 
Holm, 2003; Van Kranenburg and Hogenbirk, 2005). The data on these IPRs indicators are 
garnered from the WIPO. We note that regulations relating to the  main IP and IPR laws are 
enforced by a country’s relevant institutions after being endorsed by their legislative powers 
whereas WIPO administered treaties (including bilateral and multilateral treaties)  are recognized 
forthwith from the day they are  prescribed for the contracting party. Additionally, we 
                         
5 Data from the BSA primarily measures commercial software piracy. For more insights into the reliability of the 
piracy data, the interested reader can refer to inter alia: Traphagan and Griffith (1998) and Png (2008).   
6The adopted software piracy data has been used extensively in the literature on piracy (Marron and Steel 2000; 
Goel and Nelson, 2009; Andrés 2006a; Banerjee et al., 2005).  
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differentiate between main IP and IPR laws in the sense that the former is enacted by the 
Legislative authority of a country whereas the latter consists of both IP laws issued by the 
Executive and IPR-oriented laws enacted by the legislature7. 
 The adopted IPRs variables have been used in the  literature on property rights institutions (see 
Asongu et al., 2018).  
 It is important to note that the design of each country’s regulations and laws are 
continually reviewed to facilitate a speedier and less expensive enforcement of IPRs by the legal 
authorities. Therefore, it is presumed that countries which have carried out  fewer modifications 
to their laws on copyright are  more contented with their existing  IPR structures and hence, 
enjoy lower levels of software piracy than  those nations which regularly sign new treaties and/or 
modify their copyright laws in order to strengthen their IPRs. The WIPO is also the source of 
information used in the construction of legal agreement indicators employed in this study. Three 
indicators on legal accords are considered, namely: WIPO treaties, bilateral treaties and 
multilateral treaties.  More insights into these variables can be found on the WIPO website8.   
 Consistent with recent software piracy literature (see Andrés and Goel, 2011, pp. 7-8; 
Chang et al., 2017; Asongu et al., 2018; Martínez-Sánchez & Romeu, 2018), three main control 
variables are used in the study, namely: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, Research and 
Development (R&D) expenditure and Population density. The first-two are expected to lessen 
software piracy whereas the third is anticipated to raise it. According to the above mentioned 
authors, countries with higher levels of per capita GDP are associated with lower levels of 
piracy. This is principally because in poor countries, citizens do not have the financial resources 
to purchase the original item (Goel and Nelson, 2009; Moores and Esichaikul, 2011). This 
                         
7 The interested reader can refer to example (e.g. Indonesia) for more insights into how the data is collected:  
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=ID.  
8 http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/ 
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perception is also consistent with the anticipated effect of R&D expenditure given that nations 
with comparatively higher levels of R&D budget are also relatively wealthier countries.  
Theoretically, an increasing population density is more likely to escalate software piracy because 
more people are exposed to pirated commodities with a greater temptation to use them. 
Appendix 1 provides the definitions of variables and their corresponding sources while 
Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively present the summary statistics and pairwise correlation 
matrix.  
 
Methodology 
 
 The justification for modelling throughout the conditional distribution of software piracy 
has already been discussed in the introductory section. For this methodology, we are informed by 
studies on conditional determinants which employ Quantile regressions (QR) as estimation 
strategy (Keonker and Hallock, 2001; Billger and Goel 2009; Okada and Samreth, 2012; 
Asongu, 2013). The estimation process involves the inclusion of existing levels of the outcome 
variable in order to ensure that its responsiveness to variations in the explanatory variables in the 
conditioning information set is differentiated across countries with high-, intermediate- and low-
levels of software piracy. Hence, as software piracy is regressed on variables in the conditioning 
information set (i.e. independent variables), it is expected that the response of software piracy to 
these independent variables will vary with initial levels of software piracy (i.e. low, intermediate 
and high levels of software piracy). 
 It is important to note that the majority of previous studies have modelled software piracy 
at the conditional mean values (see Andrés, 2006ab). Whereas assessment of mean impacts is 
valuable, we extend this scope by employing QR in order to control for initial levels of software 
piracy. For example, while the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach used by Andrés (2006b) 
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is based on the assumption that error terms are normally distributed, the QR method is not based 
on such a hypothesis of normally distributed error terms. Therefore, the QR technique  enables 
the study to investigate the effect of policy tools in combating the threat of copying and imitation 
of intellectual work by differentiating the extent of the software piracy problem in countries with 
worst, worse and bad conditions. Hence, with QR, the estimates of parameters are derived at 
multiple points on the conditional distributions of the software piracy outcome variable.  
The  th quantile estimator of software piracy is calculated by solving the following 
optimization problem, where  1,0 .9   
   
,)1(min
::
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Contrary to the OLS estimator which is principally based on minimising the sum of squared 
residuals, with the QR approach, it is the weighted sum of absolute deviations that is minimised. 
For example the 25th or 75th quantiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) are examined. The 
conditional quantile of software piracy or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(  ,                                                                                                         (2) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation is 
analogous to ixxyE  )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of piracy.  
 For the model in Eq. (2), the dependent variable iy  is the software piracy indicator while 
ix  contains a constant term, internet penetration, PC users, constitution, main IP law,  IP law, 
                         
9 For ease of presentation and purpose of simplicity, the quintile estimator is disclosed without subscripts in Eq. (1). 
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WIPO treaties, multilateral treaties and bilateral treaties, GDP per capita, research and 
development expenditure (R&D) and population density.  
 In line with the characteristics of the QR method, the data is analysed for five main points 
on the conditional distribution of the outcome variable —software piracy. Thus, software piracy 
is regressed on the independent variables at the: (i) first decile (i.e.  10th quantile), (ii) first 
quartile (i.e. 25th quantile), (iii) median (i.e. 50th quantile), (iv) third quartile (i.e. 75th quantile) 
and (v) ninth decile (i.e. 90th quantile). The results are presented in the next section.  
 
Empirical results 
Presentation of results  
Empirical findings are presented in Tables 1-6 below. The first-three tables focus on interactions 
between PC users and IPRs mechanisms while the last-three tables are dedicated to 
corresponding interactions between internet penetration and IPRs channels. Given that we have 
six IPRs  regimes; each table is divided into two panels. Hence, the 6 tables corresponds to the 
twelve combinations between the two technology indicators and six IPRs channels. These twelve 
combinations are: Personal Computers and the Constitution (in Panel A of Table 1); Personal 
Computers and Main Intellectual Property (IP) law (in Panel B of Table 1); Personal Computers 
and Intellectual Property (IP) law (in Panel A of Table 2); Personal Computers and WIPO 
treaties (in Panel B of Table 2); Personal Computers and Bilateral treaties (in Panel A of Table 
3); Personal Computers and Multilateral treaties (in Panel B of Table 3); Internet Penetration and 
the Constitution (in Panel A of Table 4); Internet Penetration and Main Intellectual Property (IP) 
law (in Panel B of Table 4); Internet Penetration and Intellectual Property (IP) law (in Panel A of 
Table 5); Internet Penetration and WIPO treaties (in Panel B of Table 5); Internet Penetration 
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and Bilateral treaties (in Panel A of Table 6); Internet Penetration and Multilateral treaties (in 
Panel B of Table 6). 
Whereas the left-hand-side (LHS) of the tables corresponds to contemporary regressions, 
the right-hand-side (RHS) entails non-contemporary estimations. The interest of lagging the 
independent variables of interest by one year on the RHS is to control for potential endogeneity 
(see Mlachila et al., 2017). It is pertinent to note that the number of observations on the RHS 
may be higher than the corresponding number of observations on the LHS because of issues in 
degrees of freedom. This is apparent in an empirical exercise if combinations between the 
outcome variables and explanatory variables are more noticeable in non-contemporary 
regressions (see Asongu et al., 2018). The consistent variation in the estimated parameters 
between OLS and the selected quantiles (with respect to signs, significance and magnitude) is 
regarded as the justification of our decision to adopt the QR empirical approach. Moreover, 
distinguishing between impacts at mean points and at multiple locations on the conditional 
distribution of the outcome variable provides more opportunities for the derivation of policy 
initiatives. The presentation here follows the convention in the literature for  reporting and 
discussing empirical results when there are many tables. We begin by presenting the regression 
outcomes and then explaining them by comparing and contrasting dominant trends in  the tables.  
The following findings can be established from the interaction between PC users and 
IPRs metrics. (i) The inclusion of IPRs in the Constitution and adoption of WIPO treaties tend to 
discourage the use of pirated software in PCs.  This reducing influence appears to be more 
pronounced amongst users in  the 25th and  75th quantiles in the  Constitution-oriented 
regressions and between the 10th and 75th quantiles in the  ‘WIPO treaties’-related models. The 
increasing magnitude is an indication that the implied benefits of introducing IPRs in the 
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Constitution and acceptance of WIPO treaties are greater in countries with higher levels of 
software piracy. (ii) The establishment of main IP law and IP law do not significantly reduce PC-
related software piracy. (iii) The moderating interactive effect with bilateral treaties is observable 
throughout the conditional distribution of software piracy, with an increasing magnitude in 
bottom quantiles while the mitigating role of multilateral treaties is only evident in the bottom 
quantiles and the 75th quantile. The significant control variables have the expected signs.  
The following key findings can be established for the interaction between internet 
penetration and IPRs  indicators. (i) The provision of IPRs in the Constitution is associated with 
a moderating marginal impact in the 50th quantile and top quantiles of the software piracy 
distribution whereas there is no noticeable marginal impact from the main IP law. (ii) Whereas 
there are positive and negative marginal effects from IP law in the bottom and top quantiles 
respectively, there is a (are some) sparse evidence of a positive (negative) marginal effect in the 
10th quantile (25th and 50th quantiles) of contemporary and non-contemporary regressions. (iii) 
While the modulating effects from bilateral treaties are visible throughout the conditional 
distributions of software piracy with an increasing negative magnitude from the 10th to the 75th 
quantile, the influence of multilateral treaties is positive (negative) in the 75th (bottom) quantile 
(s). The significant control variables have the expected signs. 
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                Table 1: Personal Computers, the Constitution and Main IP law 
             
 Panel A: Personal  Computers and the Constitution  
             
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 1.635*** 1.725*** 1.534*** 1.344*** 1.957*** 1.862*** 2.083*** 2.752*** 1.743*** 2.096*** 2.131*** 2.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Personal Computer Users (PC) -0.184*** -0.103*** -0.153*** -0.187*** -0.188*** -0.441*** -0.123*** 0.0009 -0.124*** -0.101*** -0.140*** -0.395*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.971) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constitution  0.225** 0.067 0.195*** 0.387*** 0.439*** -0.253** 0.251*** 0.022 0.201*** 0.379*** 0.434*** -0.198* 
 (0.011) (0.481) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.002) (0.769) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) 
Constitution×PC -0.072*** -0.003 -0.039* -0.104*** -0.139*** 0.007 -0.077*** 0.005 -0.041** -0.103*** -0.136*** -0.0007 
 (0.003) (0.912) (0.058) (0.000) (0.000) (0.794) (0.000) (0.822) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.981) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.480*** -0.405*** -0.414*** -0.462*** -0.611*** -0.588*** -0.549*** -0.570*** -0.450*** -0.597*** -0.624*** -0.607*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Research & Development  -0.081*** -0.089*** -0.084*** -0.081*** -0.069*** -0.082*** -0.088*** -0.094*** -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.080*** -0.072*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population  0.164*** 0.037 0.103*** 0.191*** 0.213*** 0.365*** 0.111** -0.059** 0.079*** 0.123*** 0.172*** 0.325*** 
 (0.000) (0.150) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.6617 0.4569 0.4891 0.4673 0.4505 0.4573 0.6943 0.4702 0.5109 0.4919 0.4819 0.4819 
Fisher  267.41***      311.98***      
Observations 715 702 702 702 702 702 726 726 726 726 726 726 
             
             
 Panel B: Personal Computers and Mai n Intellectual Property (IP) law 
             
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 1.659*** 0.551** 1.298*** 1.159** 1.875*** 2.417*** 2.064*** 1.371*** 1.635*** 1.943*** 1.894*** 2.247*** 
 (0.001) (0.014) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Personal Computer Users (PC) -0.200*** -0.179*** -0.214*** -0.258*** -0.211*** -0.362*** -0.141*** -0.103*** -0.155*** -0.125*** -0.180*** -0.374*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Main IP law -0.067*** -0.061*** -0.075*** -0.054* -0.053** -0.130*** -0.060*** -0.058*** -0.065*** -0.013 -0.028*** -0.130*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.094) (0.047) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.507) (0.001) (0.000) 
Main IP Law×PC 0.010** 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.010 0.008 0.027** 0.009* 0.009** 0.012*** -0.0004 0.001 0.027*** 
 (0.049) (0.009) (0.000) (0.235) (0.271) (0.011) (0.072) (0.016) (0.005) (0.935) (0.816) (0.001) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.424*** -0.211*** -0.333*** -0.326*** -0.467*** -0.578*** -0.490*** -0.341*** -0.391*** -0.485*** -0.525*** -0.562*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Research & Development  -0.087*** -0.127*** -0.091*** -0.097*** -0.084*** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.124*** -0.101*** -0.103*** -0.088*** -0.095*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population  0.148*** 0.137*** 0.127*** 0.181*** 0.163*** 0.252*** 0.099** 0.061** 0.086*** 0.100*** 0.175*** 0.266*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.025) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.6854 0.4832 0.4997 0.4667 0.4574 0.4649 0.7157 0.4894 0.5200 0.4899 0.4859 0.4980 
Fisher  272.92***      316.21***      
Observations 715 715 715 715 715 715 726 726 726 726 726 726 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions).  Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where 
software piracy is least. The number of observations in contemporary specifications is lower than in non-contemporary specifications because of issues in degrees of freedom. This is essentially so 
because the combinations between software piracy and regressors are more apparent in non -contemporary regressions.  
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Table 2: Personal Computers, IP law and WIPO treaties 
             
 Panel A: Personal Computers and Intellectual Property (IP) law 
             
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 1.637*** 1.393*** 1.439*** 1.493*** 1.960*** 2.662*** 2.089*** 2.449*** 1.870*** 2.132*** 2.028*** 2.309*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
Personal Computer Users (PC) -0.196*** -0.152*** -0.187*** -0.234*** -0.189*** -0.332*** -0.131*** -0.041 -0.136*** -0.146*** -0.174*** -0.318*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.155) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
IP law 0.012 -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.017 0.029 -0.013 0.021 -0.025** -0.033*** -0.010 0.027 -0.007 
 (0.377) (0.000) (0.000) (0.245) (0.173) (0.603) (0.124) (0.023) (0.000) (0.502) (0.153) (0.809) 
IP  law×PC -0.004 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.003 -0.008 0.001 -0.006* 0.006* 0.008*** 0.001 -0.007 0.0001 
 (0.258) (0.000) (0.002) (0.341) (0.148) (0.803) (0.073) (0.057) (0.000) (0.634) (0.126) (0.98) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.469*** -0.375*** -0.387*** -0.436*** -0.581*** -0.682*** -0.539*** -0.531*** -0.459*** -0.533*** -0.599*** -0.633*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Research & Development  -0.081*** -0.087*** -0.091*** -0.086*** -0.067*** -0.084*** -0.089*** -0.094*** -0.098*** -0.093*** -0.076*** -0.087*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population  0.164*** 0.091*** 0.120*** 0.179*** 0.194*** 0.255*** 0.108** -0.018 0.077*** 0.104** 0.185*** 0.262*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.021) (0.489) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.001) 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.6594 0.4586 0.4883 0.4583 0.4421 0.4302 0.6920 0.4669 0.5097 0.4816 0.4737 0.4584 
Fisher  270.61***      313.28***      
Observations 715 715 715 715 715 715 726 726 726 726 726 726 
             
             
 Panel B: Personal Computers and WIPO  treaties  
             
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 1.774*** 1.701*** 1.878*** 1.249*** 1.611** 3.613*** 2.138*** 2.372*** 2.217*** 1.916*** 2.050*** 3.241*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Personal Computer Users (PC) -0.107** -0.158*** -0.060** -0.134*** -0.193*** -0.180** -0.057 0.0005 -0.009 -0.050 -0.153*** -0.163** 
 (0.036) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.005) (0.015) (0.230) (0.986) (0.730) (0.234) (0.009) (0.023) 
WIPO treaties 0.026 -0.036*** 0.011 0.045** 0.031 -0.033 0.028 0.024** 0.027** 0.058*** 0.025 -0.017 
 (0.258) (0.004) (0.457) (0.018) (0.347) (0.339) (0.188) (0.015) (0.037) (0.007) (0.393) (0.594) 
WIPO treaties ×PC -0.018*** 0.010*** -0.010** -0.023*** -0.020** -0.007 -0.018*** -0.007** -0.014*** -0.025*** -0.016* -0.010 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.000) (0.049) (0.476) (0.005) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.065) (0.305) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.486*** -0.408*** -0.464*** -0..429*** -0.526*** -0.803*** -0.545*** -0.519*** -0.522*** -0.543*** -0.595*** -0.753*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Research & Development  -0.085*** -0.083*** -0.094*** -0.084*** -0.081*** -0.087*** -0.092*** -0.101*** -0.096*** -0.087*** -0.086*** -0.112*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population  0.133*** 0.069** 0.057** 0.179*** 0.234*** 0.148*** 0.088** -0.033 0.015 0.108*** 0.188*** 0.157*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.045) (0.252) (0.553) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.6822 0.4541 0.4928 0.4769 0.4718 0.4850 0.7096 0.4657 0.5139 0.4977 0.4962 0.5100 
Fisher  308.41***      365.51***      
Observations 715 715 715 715 715 715 726 726 726 726 726 726 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile  Regressions).  Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where 
software piracy is least. The number of observations in contemporary specifications is lower than in non-contemporary specifications because of issues in degrees of freedom. This is essentially so 
because the combinations between software piracy and regressors are more apparent in non-contemporary regressions.  
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Table 3: Personal Computers, Bilateral and Multilateral treaties  
             
 Panel A: Personal Computers and Bilateral treaties 
             
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 1.377*** 1.846*** 1.771*** 1.231*** 1.516** 1.856 1.762*** 3.242*** 2.213*** 1.934*** 1.774*** 1.997** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.014) (0.139) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.031) 
Personal Computer Users (PC) -0.203*** -0.077*** -0.132*** -0.202*** -0.215*** -0.303** -0.148*** 0.045* -0.078*** -0.125*** -0.175*** -0.282*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.063) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) 
Bilateral treaties 0.086*** 0.044*** 0.057*** 0.066*** 0.089*** 0.099 0.091*** 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.068*** 0.097*** 0.093** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.109) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.032) 
Bilateral treaties×PC -0.017*** -0.008** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.021* -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.020*** -0.019** 
 (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.093) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.028) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.434*** -0.431*** -0.453*** -0.385*** -0.489*** -0.580*** -0.493*** -0.647*** -0.521*** -0.501*** -0.549*** -0.602*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Research & Development  -0.084*** -0.089*** -0.084*** -0.098*** -0.088*** -0.078** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.087*** -0.097*** -0.092*** -0.085*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Population  0.180*** 0.022 0.082*** 0.170*** 0.217*** 0.285** 0.132*** -0.105*** 0.033 0.100*** 0.194*** 0.263*** 
 (0.000) (0.349) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.002) (0.000) (0.104) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.6691 0.4598 0.4916 0.4675 0.4441 0.4295 0.7038 0.4776 0.5157 0.4939 0.4769 0.4664 
Fisher  333.94***      396.09***      
Observations 715 715 715 715 715 715 726 726 726 726 726 726 
             
             
 Panel B: Personal Computers and Multilateral treaties  
             
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 1.349*** 1.522*** 1.387*** 1.070*** 0.814* 2.471*** 1.847*** 2.307*** 1.944*** 1.730*** 1.238** 2.545*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.082) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) 
Personal Computer Users (PC) 0.122** 0.054** -0.062*** -0.205*** -0.233*** -0.217** -0.084* 0.104*** -0.002 -0.137*** -0.182*** -0.265*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.069) (0.000) (0.940) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Multilateral treaties 0.005 0.021*** 0.011** -0.005 0.007 -0.020 0.0004 0.016*** 0.012** -0.006 0.006 -0.028* 
 (0.496) (0.000) (0.011) (0.471) (0.382) (0.283) (0.953) (0.000) (0.018) (0.325) (0.518) (0.079) 
Multilateral treaties×PC -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.002 -0.006** -0.0007 -0.004** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.005** 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.259) (0.010) (0.886) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.316) (0.042) (0.552) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.409*** -0.416*** -0.402*** -0.328*** -0.393*** -0.582*** -0.476*** -0.536*** -0.486*** -0.427*** -0.454*** -0.591*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Research & Development  -0.067*** -0.064*** -0.060*** -0.083*** -0.060*** -0.069*** -0.075*** -0.066*** -0.072*** -0.084*** -0.068*** -0.086*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population  0.159*** 0.019 0.094*** 0.185*** 0.288*** 0.198** 0.108*** -0.045** 0.038 0.115*** 0.235*** 0.206*** 
 (0.000) (0.370) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.009) (0.024) (0.121) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.7032 0.4664 0.5129 0.4982 0.4909 0.4896 0.731 0.4760 0.5313 0.5200 0.5137 0.5185 
Fisher  337.70***      394.48***      
Observations 715 715 715 715 715 715 726 726 726 726 726 726 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile  Regressions).  Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where 
software piracy is least. The number of observations in contemporary specifications is lower than in non-contemporary specifications because of issues in degrees of freedom. This is essentially so 
because the combinations between software piracy and regressors are more apparent in non-contemporary regressions.  
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Table 4: Internet Penetration, the Constitution and Main IP law 
             
 Panel A: Internet Penetration  and the Constitution  
             
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 2.590*** 2.204*** 2.245*** 2.603*** 2.893*** 3.782*** 2.949*** 2.884*** 2.675*** 3.083*** 3.100*** 3.942*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet Penetration (Internet) -0.108*** -0.064*** -0.088*** -0.070*** -0.139*** -0.194*** -0.058*** -0.0009 -0.046*** -0.017 -0.077*** -0.157*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.937) (0.000) (0.248) (0.002) (0.000) 
Constitution  0.167* 0.002 0.166** 0.385*** 0.249** -0.057 0.207** -0.021 0.156** 0.359*** 0.364*** 0.064 
 (0.051) (0.979) (0.041) (0.000) (0.045) (0.652) (0.012) (0.769) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.523) 
Constitution×Internet -0.048** 0.011 -0.034 -0.104*** -0.087** -0.024 -0.058*** 0.017 -0.026 -0.097*** -0.115*** -0.050* 
 (0.033) (0.716) (0.146) (0.000) (0.016) (0.516) (0.008) (0.427) (0.157) (0.000) (0.000) (0.095) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.604*** -0.474*** -0.518*** -0.669*** 0.743*** -0.822*** -0.662*** -0.587*** -0.573*** -0.744*** -0.757*** -0.846*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Research & Development  -0.089*** -0.097*** -0.086*** -0.090*** -0.092*** -0.122*** -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.096*** -0.114*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population  0.070*** -0.005 0.035** 0.087*** 0.143*** 0.123*** 0.027 -0.067*** -0.014 0.034*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 
 (0.006) (0.732) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.269) (0.000) (0.288) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.6677 0.4567 0.4859 0.4634 0.4565 0.4572 0.6924 0.4686 0.5033 0.4859 0.4773 0.4789 
Fisher  274.72***      314.69***      
Observations 729 729 729 729 729 729 743 743 743 743 743 743 
             
             
 Panel B: Internet Penetration  and Main Intellectual Property (IP) law 
             
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 2.557*** 1.390*** 2.174*** 2.773*** 2.283*** 3.558*** 2.902*** 2.582*** 2.401*** 2.892*** 2.834*** 3.777*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet Penetration (Internet) -0.110*** -0.069*** -0.080*** -0.082*** -0.195*** -0.210*** -0.060*** -0.00003 -0.048*** -0.030 -0.145*** -0.179*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.998) (0.003) (0.150) (0.000) (0.000) 
Main IP law -0.043** -0.038** -0.028* -0.022 -0.049* -0.092** -0.035* -0.042** -0.032* -0.004 -0.056** -0.093*** 
 (0.032) (0.016) (0.066) (0.408) (0.068) (0.038) (0.070) (0.015) (0.057) (0.809) (0.048) (0.003) 
Main IP Law×Internet 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.017 0.003 0.005 0.004 -0.002 0.009 0.018** 
 (0.329) (0.299) (0.343) (0.693) (0.332) (0.173) (0.511) (0.161) (0.276) (0.702) (0.245) (0.041) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.559*** -0.328*** -0.483*** -0.608*** -0.564*** -0.743*** -0.619*** -0.547*** -0.511*** -0.641*** -0.635*** -0.786*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Research & Development  -0.095*** -0.143*** -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.091*** -0.108*** -0.099*** -0.114*** -0.118*** -0.109*** -0.094*** -0.110*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population  0.060** 0.040*** 0.031* 0.038 0.159*** 0.116*** 0.019 -0.037** 0.001 0.015 0.097*** 0.092*** 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.061) (0.181) (0.000) (0.004) (0.403) (0.042) (0.948) (0.481) (0.001) (0.001) 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.6850 0.4752 0.4900 0.4621 0.4685 0.4735 0.7074 0.4816 0.5084 0.4823 0.4846 0.4947 
Fisher  278.63***      319.29***      
Observations 729 729 729 729 729 729 743 743 743 743 743 743 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions).  Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where 
software piracy is least. The number of observations in contemporary specifications is lower than in non-contemporary specifications because of issues in degrees of freedom. This is essentially so 
because the combinations between software piracy and regressors are more apparent in non -contemporary regressions.  
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Table 5: Internet Penetration, IP law and WIPO treaties 
             
 Panel A: Internet Penetration  and Intellectual Property (IP) law 
             
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 2.616*** 2.071*** 2.092*** 2.935*** 2.346*** 3.692*** 2.978*** 2.728*** 2.295*** 3.240*** 2.999*** 3.842*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet Penetration (Internet) -0.110*** -0.084*** -0.102*** -0.086*** -0.156*** -0.177*** -0.056** -0.002 -0.073*** -0.024 -0.086*** -0.147*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000 (0.010) (0.833) (0.000) (0.160) (0.000) (0.000) 
IP law 0.013 -0.035*** -0.021*** -0.011 0.041*** 0.022 0.021 -0.013* -0.014** -0.008 0.053*** 0.029* 
 (0.320) (0.000) (0.000) (0.318) (0.002) (0.265) (0.100) (0.078) (0.026) (0.393) (0.000) (0.088) 
IP  law×Internet -0.003 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.002 -0.011*** -0.007 -0.005* 0.003 0.003* 0.001 -0.013*** -0.008** 
 (0.255) (0.000) (0.003) (0.451) (0.002) (0.153) (0.071) (0.150) (0.061) (0.566) (0.000) (0.046) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.602*** -0.465*** -0.489*** -0.664*** -0.617*** -0.794*** -0.660*** -0.570*** -0.525*** -0.711*** -0.727*** -0.831*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Research & Development  -0.091*** -0.097*** -0.099*** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.110*** -0.096*** -0.099*** -0.108*** -0.103*** -0.089*** -0.113*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population  0.066** 0.018 0.050*** 0.044** 0.152*** 0.105** 0.022 -0.052*** 0.028** -0.0007 0.086*** 0.087** 
 (0.010) (0.177) (0.000) (0.042) (0.000) (0.021) (0.383) (0.000) (0.048) (0.970) (0.000) (0.018) 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.6667 0.4592 0.4856 0.4565 0.4571 0.4473 0.6914 0.4651 0.5012 0.4762 0.4781 0.4719 
Fisher  276.72***      317.11***      
Observations 729 729 729 729 729 729 743 743 743 743 743 743 
             
             
 Panel B: Internet Penetration  and WIPO  treaties  
             
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 2.823*** 2.263*** 2.107*** 3.146*** 3.639*** 4.833*** 3.157*** 2.674*** 2.409*** 3.269*** 3.826*** 4.847*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet Penetration (Internet) -0.080** -0.112*** -0.062*** -0.027 -0.140*** -0.114** -0.040 -0.030** -0.017 0.047 -0.109*** -0.104*** 
 (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.338) (0.000) (0.021) (0.194) (0.040) (0.216) (0.142) (0.006) (0.007) 
WIPO treaties -0.013 -0.039*** -0.001 0.001 -0.046 -0.040 -0.017 -0.009 0.009 0.032 -0.055* -0.056* 
 (0.572) (0.001) (0.928) (0.949) (0.136) (0.296) (0.440) (0.299) (0.384) (0.172) (0.058) (0.064) 
WIPO treaties ×Internet -0.004 0.012*** -0.005 -0.009 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.004 -0.007** -0.016** 0.006 0.003 
 (0.482) (0.000) (0.108) (0.140) (0.716) (0.847) (0.639) (0.112) (0.016) (0.023) (0.473) (0.712) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.612*** -0.477*** -0.492*** -0.687*** -0.783*** -0.941*** -0.665*** -0.560*** -0.542*** -0.734*** -0.787*** -0.945*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Research & Development  -0.094*** -0.097*** -0.104*** -0.096*** -0.091*** -0.116*** -0.099*** -0.094*** -0.105*** -0.101*** -0.099*** -0.125*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population  0.046* 0.008 0.041*** 0.018 0.080*** 0.028 0.008 -0.041*** 0.003 -0.013 0.039 0.019 
 (0.051) (0.594) (0.001) (0.387) (0.005) (0.251) (0.728) (0.007) (0.778) (0.578) (0.133) (0.412) 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.6804 0.4541 0.4887 0.4669 0.4763 0.4851 0.7024 0.4633 0.5052 0.4837 0.4944 0.5052 
Fisher  300.47***      342.94***      
Observations 729 729 729 729 729 729 743 743 743 743 743 743 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions).  Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where software piracy is least. The number of observations in contemporary specifications is lower than in non-contemporary specifications because of issues in 
degrees of freedom. This is essentially so because the combinations between software piracy and regressors are more apparent in non-contemporary regressions.  
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Table 6: Internet Penetration, Bilateral and Multilateral treaties  
             
 Panel A: Internet Penetration  and Bilateral treaties  
             
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 2.341*** 2.120*** 2.395*** 2.636*** 2.109*** 3.931*** 2.683*** 3.004*** 2.588*** 2.866*** 2.542*** 3.600*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet Penetration (Internet) -0.111*** -0.064*** -0.069*** -0.063*** -0.169*** -0.167*** -0.062*** 0.013 -0.044*** -0.021 -0.097*** -0.153*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.187) (0.000) (0.122) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bilateral treaties 0.102*** 0.053*** 0.076*** 0.083*** 0.113*** 0.053 0.103*** 0.073*** 0.085*** 0.107*** 0.114*** 0.057* 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) 
Bilateral treaties×Internet -0.021*** -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.023*** -0.012* -0.021*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.012** 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.564*** -0.463*** -0.546*** -0.605*** -0.583*** -0.865*** -0.619*** -0.615*** -0.579*** -0.645*** -0.656*** -0.824*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Research & Development  -0.097*** -0.094*** -0.085*** -0.106*** -0.103*** -0.080*** -0.102*** -0.087*** -0.088*** -0.111*** -0.104*** -0.097*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population  0.081*** -0.001 0.020 0.040* 0.170*** 0.100** 0.040 -0.075*** -0.001 0.009 0.114*** 0.112*** 
 (0.001) (0.898) (0.254) (0.070) (0.000) (0.011) (0.109) (0.000) (0.885) (0.550) (0.000) (0.004) 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.6824 0.4629 0.4924 0.4676 0.4665 0.4547 0.7088 0.4783 0.5129 0.4927 0.4881 0.4805 
Fisher  338.07***      417.83***      
Observations 729 729 729 729 729 729 743 743 743 743 743 743 
             
             
 Panel B: Internet Penetration  and Multilateral treaties  
             
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 2.505*** 1.744*** 2.223*** 2.850*** 3.222*** 3.604*** 2.905*** 2.592*** 2.597*** 3.315*** 3.493*** 4.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet Penetration (Internet) -0.073** 0.061*** -0.024 -0.088*** -0.184*** -0.098 -0.045 0.060*** 0.047** -0.047* -0.147*** -0.146*** 
 (0.021) (0.000) (0.182) (0.000) (0.000) (0.107) (0.132) (0.000) (0.016) (0.083) (0.000) (0.005) 
Multilateral treaties -0.007 0.017*** 0.001 -0.014** -0.026*** -0.013 -0.013* 0.005 0.006 -0.020*** -0.025*** -0.030** 
 (0.346) (0.000) (0.716) (0.019) (0.000) (0.386) (0.060) (0.217) (0.236) (0.002) (0.000) (0.027) 
Multilateral treaties×Internet -0.002 -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.0002 0.003* -0.001 -0.0008 -0.004*** -0.005*** 0.001 0.003* 0.003 
 (0.234) (0.000) (0.002) (0.901) (0.076) (0.808) (0.664) (0.000) (0.000) (0.502) (0.090) (0.360) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.547*** -0.437*** -0.510*** -0.567*** -0.668*** -0.726*** -0.601*** -0.566*** -0.579*** -0.645*** -0.716*** -0.765*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Research & Development  -0.079*** -0.074*** -0.063*** -0.081*** -0.088*** -0.117*** -0.084*** -0.065*** -0.082*** -0.084*** -0.091*** -0.114*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population  0.058*** -0.003 0.026* 0.024 0.098*** 0.070** 0.018 -0.051*** -0.019 -0.015 0.065*** 0.054* 
 (0.009) (0.812) (0.082) (0.181) (0.000) (0.045) (0.399) (0.000) (0.200) (0.443) (0.000) (0.081) 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.7046 0.4611 0.5075 0.4969 0.4996 0.4944 0.7278 0.4714 0.5248 0.5157 0.5158 0.5187 
Fisher  349.65***      400.19***      
Observations 729 729 729 729 729 729 743 743 743 743 743 743 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions).  Lower quanti les (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where 
software piracy is least. The number of observations in contemporary specifications is lower than in non-contemporary specifications because of issues in degrees of freedom. This is essentially so 
because the combinations between software piracy and regressors are more apparent in non -contemporary regressions.  
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Further discussion and policy implications  
 The findings are discussed in three main strands. They comprise : (i) differences in the 
effects of IPRs measurements (positive versus negative and significant versus insignificant  
effects); (ii) variations across the conditional distributions (where the magnitude of the effects 
are explained) and (iii) differences in observed impacts from the interaction of IPR channels with 
technology dynamics.  
 First, on differences in the correlation of IPRs channels with technology, we have 
observed that main IP law interacts with PCs to raise the prevalence of pirated software in the 
90th quantile and bottom quantiles whereas IP law has a similar increasing effect exclusively in 
the bottom quantiles. The corresponding interaction of internet penetration displays a similar 
increasing   marginal effects on software piracy, although these are not for the most part 
consistent across contemporary and non-contemporary specifications, notably at the: (i) 90th 
quantile with main IP law in non-contemporary regressions; (ii) IP law in the 50th (bottom) 
quantile(s) for non-contemporary (contemporary) specifications; (iii) WIPO treaties in the 10th 
quantile of contemporary specifications and (iv) multilateral treaties in the 75th quantile. 
Evidently, the findings show that with a few exceptions, the property rights institutions 
effectively interact with technology to reduce software piracy. The exceptions justify the 
relevance of our decision to employ an estimation model which accounts for the initial levels of 
software piracy.  
 The insignificant effect of some of the IPR indicators implies that  a mere inclusion of the 
IP law and/or implementation of an IPR treaty without a corresponding improvement in the 
quality of the technology network with which IPRs  interact,  is  necessary but not sufficient to 
fighting the corresponding software piracy. As a policy implication, the adoption of one IPR law 
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and treaty  should continually be complemented with  more modern and innovative IPRs laws 
and treaties in order to deter software piracy. The underlying insignificance may also infer that 
the institutions currently in place are not effective in upholding IPRs to drive KE (see Andres et 
al., 2015).  
 Overall, the increasing impact on piracy of the IP law channel and overwhelming 
diminishing piracy effects of our other measures of IPRs is broadly consistent with Asongu 
(2015)10. Nevertheless, some subtle differences between the results of this study and those 
established by Asongu (2015) are noteworthy. For example, (i) multilateral treaties, main IP law 
and WIPO treaties interact with technology to produce decreasing marginal effects which have 
different magnitudes throughout the software piracy conditional distributions; (ii) bilateral 
treaties lessen the use of pirated software with the moderating effect rising throughout the 
software piracy distribution and (iii) the increasing piracy effect of IP laws is contingent on the 
initial software piracy levels and the sophistication  of technology embodied in the pirated 
software.  
 Second, positive threshold effects are apparent when bilateral treaties are combined with 
both PC users and internet penetration. A similar positive threshold effect was calculated with 
respect to the Constitution and WIPO treaties in three successive streams of quantiles when they 
are interacted with PC users. The notion of positive threshold should be understood in the 
perspective that the effectiveness of the underlying IPRs channels rises with increasing levels of 
software piracy. This is primarily because the magnitude of  the estimated moderating effects 
increases from lower levels of software piracy to higher levels of software piracy. As a policy 
implication, some IPRs institutions are can be adopted by sampled countries in relation to their 
                         
10 The term ‘broad’ is employed to emphasis the fact that this study cannot be directly compa red with Asongu 
(2015) because the latter is: (i) focused exclusively on Africa: (ii) based on mean values of software piracy and (iii) 
is modelled with non-interactive interactive specifications.  
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existing levels of software piracy. Moreover, the fact that their effectiveness increases with the 
level of software piracy is an advantage over other IPRs mechanisms. This is essentially because 
in order to for policy makers to reduce software piracy by a higher magnitude in countries with 
high levels of software piracy vis-à-vis their counterparts with low levels of software piracy, a 
bilateral  IP treaty of the same magnitude can be implemented in all countries concerned. For 
instance, if Nigeria and the United Kingdom sign a bilateral agreement on IPR protection with 
regards to software piracy that is linked to PC and internet penetration, it is expected that the 
implementation of the bilateral agreement will significantly discourage piracy in Nigeria (a 
country with a high initial level of software piracy) more than the corresponding reduction in the 
United Kingdom (a country with a low initial level of software piracy). 
 Third, there are obvious differences in the relevance of IPRs institutions in fighting 
software piracy. It follows from the fact that their effectiveness is not only contingent on existing 
levels of software piracy, but also on the technology embodied in the pirated software. To be 
sure, some IPR regimes are more conducive with  specific technological settings. For instance 
whereas IP laws are not successful when pirated software is physically installed in PCs, it is 
effective in some quantiles when pirated software is downloaded over the internet. As a policy 
implication when adopting IPRs mechanisms in the fight against software piracy, the nature of 
the technology with which the pirated software is deployed should be considered.  In other 
words, the implementation of IP laws should be preceded by individual-country studies aimed at 
investigating the effectiveness of such policies at varying initial levels of software piracy and 
sophistication of technology network.   
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Conclusion and future research directions  
 This study has extended the literature on fighting software piracy by examining how 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) regimes interact with technology to mitigate software piracy 
when existing levels of software piracy are considered. Two technology (internet penetration and 
PC users) and six IPRs measurements (constitution, IPR laws, main IP laws, WIPO Treaties, 
bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties) are used in the analysis. The empirical evidence is 
based on: (i) a panel of 99 countries for the period 1994-2010 and (ii) interactive contemporary 
and non-contemporary Quantile regressions. The decision to use interactive Quantile regressions 
as opposed to the OLS method employed in previous studies centres on two main reasons. First, 
interactive QR modeling allows us to demonstrate more clearly the policy implications of the 
supposition that IPR regimes may perform differently depending on the nature of the 
technologies embodied in the pirated software. Second, interactive QR approach helps to  control 
for the influence of initial levels  of software piracy differentiated across countries with high-, 
intermediate- and low-values.  
 The following findings  are confirmed. First, with regard to the  effect on software piracy 
of the interaction between PC users and IPRs measurements, we reported that: (i) the 
Constitution and WIPO treaties have moderating effects of increasing magnitude respectively 
between 25th and the 75th quantiles and between 10th and 75th quantiles; (ii)  main intellectual 
property (IP) law and IP law do not significantly reduce PC-related software piracy and; (iii) the 
modulating interactive effect with bilateral treaties is noticeable throughout the conditional 
distribution of software piracy, with an increasing magnitude in bottom quantiles while the 
mitigating role of multilateral treaties is only evident in the bottom quantiles and 75th quantile. 
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 Second, with respect to the impact on software piracy of the interaction between PC users 
and IPRs  regimes: (i) the Constitution indicator has a modulating effect in the 50th quantile and 
top quantiles whereas there are no noticeable piracy reducing impact from the Main IP laws; (ii) 
while there are piracy increasing and diminishing marginal effects from IP law in the  bottom 
and top quantiles respectively,  there is a (are some) sparse evidence of an piracy 
increasing(negative) marginal effect in the 10th quantile (25th and 50th quantiles) of contemporary 
and non-contemporary regressions and; (iii) while the moderating effects from bilateral treaties 
are visible throughout the conditional distribution of software piracy with an increasing 
magnitude from the 10th quantile to the 75th quantile, the rising (reducing) influence of 
multilateral treaties on software piracy is observable in the 75th (bottom) quantile (quantiles).  
 Generally, our findings indicate that modulating effect of IP laws is greater in countries 
with high levels of software piracy. Policy implications have been discussed in the light of inter 
alia: (i) differences in the effects of IPRs regimes (increasing versus decreasing and significant 
versus insignificant effects); (ii) variations across the conditional distributions (in terms of the 
magnitude of the established effects) and (iii) differences in the piracy moderating effects of the 
interaction of IPR channels with technology dynamics. It is apparent from the above discussion 
that the adoption of blanket policies in the fight against software piracy  is unlikely to succeed 
unless they are contingent on the existing levels of technologies and software piracy in the 
country concerned. Future research could improve on the extant literature by interacting IPRs 
metrics among themselves. This potential line of inquiry would  clarify whether or not IPRs are 
complementary or  substitutes.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Abbreviation Variable Definitions (Measurement) Sources 
    
Piracy Piracy Logarithm of Piracy rate (annual %) BSA 
    
Growth per capita GDP Logarithm of GDP per Capita, PPP (international constant 
dollars, 2005) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Research and 
Development  
R & D Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Internet Penetration Internet Logarithm of Internet Users per 1000   GMID 
    
PC Users  PC Logarithm of PC Users per capita  GMID 
    
Population  Pop. Logarithm of Population  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Constitution  Const. Dummy variable: Copyright is mentioned in the 
constitution  
WIPO 
    
Main_IP_law MIPlaw Main Intellectual Property Law WIPO 
    
IP_rlaw IPlaw Intellectual Property Rights Law WIPO 
    
Wipotreaties WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization  WIPO 
    
Mutilateral Multi. Multilateral Treaties  WIPO 
    
Bilateral Bilat.  Bilateral  Treaties  WIPO 
    
WDI: World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. BSA: Business Software Alliance. GMID: 
Global Market Information Database. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Log: Logarithm. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organizati on.  
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics (1994-2010) 
Panel A: Summary Statistics  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Obs 
       
Dependent 
Variable  
Software Piracy rate  0.255 0.449 -0.602 1.995 1500 
       
 
Technology and 
control variables  
GDP per capita (log) 4.006 0.433 3.008 4.924 1643 
Research & Development (R & D) 1.079 0.963 0.006 4.864 811 
Internet Penetration (log) 2.807 1.183 -1.000 5.622 1616 
Personal Computer Users (log) 3.009 0.837 0.698 5.464 1557 
Population (log) 7.063 0.712 5.424 9.126 1682 
       
 
 IPRs laws and 
treaties  related 
Constitution 0.242 0.428 0.000 1 1683 
Main IP Law 2.134 2.550 0.000 20 1683 
IP Law 2.260 4.669 0.000 47 1683 
WIPO Treaties  3.455 1.877 0.000 7 1683 
Multilateral Treaties  10.594 5.816 0.000 25 1683 
Bilateral Treaties  0.998 2.532 0.000 21 1683 
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Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
“Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China,  Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Guatemala,  Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, UAE, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia”.  
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. ICT: Information and Communication Technology.  Scandi: Scandinavian. Obs: 
Observations.  
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix 
             
Piracy GDP R & D Internet PC Pop. Const. MIPlaw IPrlaw WIPO Multi. Bilat.  
             
1.000 -0.766 -0.703 -0.503 -0.551 0.009 0.108 -0.405 -0.109 -0.215 -0.534 -0.180 Piracy  
 1.000 0.653 0.386 0.482 -0.206 -0.173 0.285 0.067 0.077 0.376 0.160 GDP 
  1.000 0.424 0.530 0.044 -0.161 0.221 -0.042 0.035 0.414 0.248 R & D 
   1.000 0.897 0.609 0.145 0.284 0.196 0.119 0.316 0.299 Internet 
    1.000 0.688 0.123 0.286 0.197 0.036 0.319 0.340 PCs 
     1.000 0.269 0.068 0.179 -0.087 0.031 0.231 Pop. 
      1.000 0.075 0.348 0.068 -0.098 0.241 Const. 
       1.000 0.513 0.168 0.184 -0.087 MIPlaw 
        1.000 0.209 0.147 -0.006 IPlaw 
         1.000 0.569 0.176 WIPO 
          1.000 0.078 Multi. 
           1.000 Bilat. 
             
GDP: GDP per capita. R&D: Research and Development. Internet: Internet penetration. PC: Personal Computer Users. Pop: 
Population. Const: Constitution. MIPlaw: Main Intellectual Property Law. IPrlaw: Intellectual Property Rights Law. WIPO: 
World Intellectual Property Organization Treaties. Multi: Multilateral Treaties. Bilat: Bilateral Treaties.  
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